

Frederick Douglass and “Nuestra América”

by Gregory Stephens

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References to Latin American and the Caribbean in Frederick Douglass’ speeches and writings span half a century and include Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica and Nicaragua (in order of frequency). This engagement with “nuestra América” began with his opposition to the United States war against Mexico in 1846. The capstone of Douglass’ engagement with the Caribbean world was his residency as U.S. Minister in Haiti 1889-1891, and his work as commissioner of the Haiti pavilion during the 1893 World’s Fair in Chicago.

The concept of "Nuestra América" (our America) comes from Cuban patriot José Martí. Martí was Douglass’ younger contemporary: they both died in 1895, although Douglass, born in 1818, was 35 years older than Martí. Slavery was not outlawed in Cuba until almost a quarter century after the Emancipation Proclamation in the United States. Martí witnessed the brutality of slavery in Cuba as a youth, and this profoundly influenced his commitment to racial equality, and to political self-determination in Latin America.¹ During a 15-year exile in New York, Martí warned of the United States threat to the sovereignty of people south of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo in Spanish). He famously described “our America” as a cultural and political entity that “stretches from the Rio Bravo to the Straits of Magellan.” Martí described this imagined “American republic” in multi-ethnic terms: “the indigenous, negro or criollo.”

To speak of Douglass and “nuestra América” in the same breath, then, requires not only a review of Douglass’ relations with and attitudes towards Latin America and the Caribbean, but also an inquiry about the degree to which Douglass was able to transcend North American myopia, and to understand something of the cultural and political realities of this other America.

Douglass’ interest in *nuestra América* rose in part from a sense of kinship with African and indigenous peoples, based on his empathy with their suffering or exclusion. (He frequently reminded audiences that he was part Indian). But his political perspective was almost entirely shaped by his opposition to slavery. Since slavery persisted in parts of *nuestra América* through the 1880s, this allowed Douglass to continue his abolitionist campaign, in some sense, long after legal slavery had been abolished in the United States. From the 1840s through the U.S. Civil War, Douglass’ comments about *nuestra América* centered upon his awareness of the ambitions of the U.S. “slave power” to expand the slave system into Spanish-speaking countries.

It was while Douglass was in Great Britain in 1845-47, promoting his *Narrative* and helping to build “an antislavery wall,”² that he became fully aware of both the transnational nature of slavery as an institution, and the international reach of opposition to slavery. In a farewell address in London on March 30, 1847, Douglass remarked: “Slavery never sleeps or slumbers.” But clearly, neither did abolitionists. Douglass specifically chose to mention two abolitionist ministers in Jamaica, William Knibb and Thomas Burchell, as examples of men of faith who followed the Biblical injunction to “preach deliverance to the captive.”³

It is appropriate that Douglass first mentioned the U.S.-Mexican war while in Great Britain in 1846. As Europeans put pressure on the U.S. South, and on those in the North and in Europe who bought products produced with slave labor, the “slave-ocracy” began searching for off-shore colonies where they could transplant their plantation system. “The Mexican War gave the South its last relief from constriction,” as William McFeely has noted. Douglass roundly condemned the

Mexican war, from English soil, and supported the Wilmot Proviso, an attempt to outlaw the importation of slavery into territories taken from Mexico. We see him beginning to develop a sort of cultural relativity, reminding a Bristol audience in 1847: “In 1829 Mexico, although a semi-barbarous state, had declared the entire abolition of slavery in her territories.”⁴

Having listened to the racist rhetoric being bandied about during the war with Mexico, Douglass later put this in comparative perspective, when making a case for the “semi-barbarous state” of white supremacists during the Civil War years:

“But it is said that the Negro belongs to an inferior race. Inferior race!...It is an old argument... When the United states wants to possess herself of Mexican territory, the Mexicans are an inferior race. When Russia wants a share of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks are an inferior race, the sick man of Europe. So, too, when England wishes to impose some new burden on Ireland...the Irish are denounced as an inferior race.”⁵

After the war, Douglass became a Republican Party loyalist and political appointee. As such, he was able to speak in mainstream forums such as the *New York Times*. One senses that Douglass was trying to bring new thinking into the public sphere, yet having to speak in a language intelligible to his readers. So it is not always clear how much of what Douglass has to say about *nuestra América* reflects his own opinions, and to what degree Douglass is consciously trying to work around the biases he assumes in his readers.

In 1871 Douglass published an essay called “Our Southern Sister Republic” in which he welcomed the imminent re-election of Mexican president Benito Juárez, and praised Juárez’ “remarkable gifts as a statesman.” Douglass clearly identified with Juárez, “originally an illiterate Indian.” To a degree his attitude was progressive for its time. When assessing the predicament of a country like Mexico, Douglass wrote, people in developed countries should strive not “to commit the error of judging them from our own standpoint, making ourselves the standard.” Yet he went on to speculate that “their comparatively low state of civilization” might be due not only to Spanish tyranny, but also “perhaps a deficiency inherent to the Latin races.”⁶

Waldo Martin argues that Douglass’ “Americanism, assimilationism, and race consciousness tended to impede his comprehension of the perspectives of other colored peoples. Ultimately, he could [not] see beyond...the dominant Anglo-American cultural paradigm which he essentially accepted, though he rejected its racism.”⁷

Slavery, both its physical persistence, and its political and cultural legacies, continued to be central to Douglass thinking about the Caribbean, and Central America. In 1869-70, Douglass had a rare difference of opinion with Senator Charles Sumner over “the Cuba question.” “It has seemed to me, that our government might have conceded belligerent rights to the insurgents,” he wrote. To grant belligerent rights meant to recognize that the rebels were fighting a just war, not only against Spanish imperialism, but against slavery. But the Grant administration refused this recognition, and even former abolitionists like Sumner had sided with Grant. In a letter written in 1873, Douglass recalled: “The first gleam of the sword of freedom and independence in Cuba secured my sympathy with the revolutionary cause.” But he repressed his conviction that the U.S. should have accorded belligerent rights. “I have deemed our government, with all the facts of the situation at hand before it, a safer guide than my own feelings.”⁸

Douglass had engaged in a long *ante-bellum* campaign to sway public opinion in favor of “belligerent rights” within the U.S., i.e., the right of slaves to gain their freedom by any means necessary. But trying to expand U.S. support for revolutionary movements in America’s “back yard” was an uphill battle, whether that concerned rebellion against slavery and against Spanish rule in Cuba, or resistance to North America military interference in Nicaragua.

Before the Civil War, Douglass was willing to attack U.S. imperial ambitions. His politically astute speech, “Aggressions of the Slave Power,” included a fierce, historically grounded critique of the fiasco of William Walker’s invasion of Nicaragua. “The recognition of Walker’s Government in Nicaragua” in 1856, proclaimed Douglass, “is part of the foreign policy of the slave power, which now rules everything at Washington. It is the first definite step...by our Government, towards the extension of Slavery over South America, the conquest of Cuba, and the final absorption of all the Caribbean Islands. [It is] a re-enactment of that part of our history, which records the progress of events leading to the annexation of Texas.”⁹

Douglass’ diagnosis of the design of the slaveholders was unflinching: “They purpose to plant Slavery in South America, to overthrow the Black government of Hayti; and possess themselves of the West Indian Islands, and to reduce this whole continent to the rule of Slavery.” His view of the international implications U.S. imperial delusions have a contemporary ring: “The conservatives of Europe hate us for our loud-mouthed professions of Liberty; and the Democrats of Europe despise us for our hypocrisy, and our shameless support of Slavery.” His rejection of U.S. imperialism, when paired with slave power, was uncompromising: “No intelligent man can suppose for a moment, that the United States...can peaceably annex any part of South America to this Union.”¹⁰

Yet Douglass later supported attempts by the Grant and Harrison administrations to “annex” all or part of the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. His willingness at times to toe the Republican Party line, or even to convince himself that North American land grabs in *nuestra América* were a good thing, grew out of three main factors. First, Douglass was convinced that if the Republicans were driven from power, the fragile rights of African Americans would evaporate. Second, Douglass was a genuine patriot; after the war, he subscribed to some degree to the ideology of America’s “civilizing mission” in the world. And third, Douglass’ post-Civil War attitudes about the imperial ambitions of the U.S. were guided by the hope that an expansion of U.S. interests into the Caribbean would abolish slavery in the region more quickly.

In the early 1870s, Douglass’ “eyes were riveted on the success of [President Ulysses Grant’s] vigorous southern policy in crushing Klan terrorism and in safeguarding the lives and civil rights of the freedmen,” writes Philip Foner.¹¹ In Douglass’ view, Grant was “for stamping out this murderous *ku-klux* as he stamped out the [Southern] rebellion.” His support for the Grant administration grew “from no spirit of hero worship or blind attachment to a mere party,” he insisted, but from the conviction that “in this hour there is no middle ground.” Douglass went so far as to describe Grant and the Republicans as “the only visible hope of the colored race in the United States” in 1871.¹²

In this context Douglass became involved in Grant’s efforts to annex the Dominican Republic (re: Santo Domingo). This young nation had endured almost a quarter century of tribal war between two generals. In 1861 General Pedro Santana invited the Spanish to take control of the nation, although they were soon forced out. Then General Buenaventura Baez asked the United States step in, first during the Andrew Johnson administration, and later with Grant.

Beginning in September of 1869, Grant tried to line up support for a treaty of annexation between the United States and the Dominican Republic, which had been approved by President Baez. But Senator Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and an abolitionist ally of Douglass' since the early 1850s, came out strongly against annexation. In June 1870, Sumner convinced the Senate to reject the treaty. Yet Grant obtained authorization from Congress to appoint three commissioners to survey conditions in Santo Domingo, and determine whether or not Dominicans desired annexation. Douglass was appointed secretary to the commission in January 1871. Before departing, Douglass visited Ottilia Assing, who reported that Douglass was "enchanted at the prospect of visiting a tropical island."¹³

Douglass and the Santo Domingo commission spent about two months in the Dominican Republic, January 24-March 26, 1871. Douglass also visited Jamaica briefly, writing an article about the "Coolie Trade" in which he contrasted the suffering of the "genuine Hindus" (imported after the abolition of slavery in the Anglo West Indies) with "the broad mouths, full lips, cheerful faces of the Negroes of Jamaica." Now conscious of the need not to give "offense to the rights of property," he concluded that "this new class of cheap laborers" was "a respectable commerce, in no way inconsistent with high morality and advanced civilization."¹⁴

Douglass claimed to have entered Santo Domingo with an open mind. He was receptive to Senator Sumner's argument, made in private meetings, that President Baez was a despot, and that annexation "would commit the American people to a dance of blood." Reporters who talked to Douglass on ship seemed to have convinced him that the whole annexation affair was a sordid business designed to benefit "land sharks." Yet once on land, he became convinced that the people of Santo Domingo were "earnest and eager for annexation."¹⁵

After Grant submitted the Commission's report to Congress in April 1871, Douglass published a series of seven essays in *New National Review*, explaining why he now supported annexation. While acknowledging that commercial interests were important to the U.S., he was, as always, focused on racial equality. "The anti-slavery side of annexation is to me the strongest and most controlling," Douglass wrote. By annexing Santo Domingo, North Americans could "strike a blow at slavery wherever it may exist in the tropics." By acting as a "grand civilizing force," the U.S. could hasten the abolition of slavery in Cuba. Sidestepping the issue of self-determination for a "Negro republic," Douglass even argued that Haiti, as well Santo Domingo, could do more to raise the world's opinion of "the colored race" in association with the U.S., than in isolation, should she "of her own free will" decide "to join the American Union as a state."¹⁶ Perhaps he thought of the "greater South" of *nuestra América* like he did the American South: "It is better to be a part of the great whole than to be the whole of a small part."¹⁷

As Philip Foner observes, "Douglass' confidence in the ability of the United States to plant the seeds of liberty and equality all over Latin America must have puzzled a number of his colleagues." He had recently spoken of his sympathy for the "revolutionary cause" in Cuba, and written in 1870 about the "inhuman brutishness" of racists in New York. Yet one should not underestimate either the patriotism or the "buoyant disposition" that had always co-existed with Douglass' fiercest critiques of the U.S. Even after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, when acknowledging that things did "not appear very favorable to our remaining here," Douglass still spoke firmly of the United States as "our country."¹⁸

Douglass had always opposed emigration / "colonization." But he did have a moment of doubt in faith in 1861, in the dark period after the *Dred Scott* decision, after the repeal of Personal Liberty Laws by Republican legislatures, while northern mobs attacked innocent Afro-Americans. It is not surprising that at that moment, he looked to Haiti as a possible adopted homeland. In early April, he made plans to visit Haiti

to investigate an emigration movement being advocated by James Redpath. His steamer was scheduled to sail April 25, chartered by the Haitian Bureau of Emigration in Boston. He published an announcement about his planned trip in *Frederick Douglass' Paper*. But he changed his plans at the last moment, after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter initiated the Civil War, and Lincoln called for volunteers.¹⁹

Haiti had always held a very special place in Douglass' heart, as it did for so many people in the African diaspora. Toussaint L'Ourverture was one of the heroes in the gallery of freedom fighters he honored, along with British abolitionists like Thomas Clarkson. But Haiti was different, with the "peculiar and romantic interest" of "first things." Late in life, in an 1893 lecture at the Haiti Pavilion of the Chicago World's Columbian Exposition, Douglass said:

"We owe much to Walker for his Appeal, to John Brown for the blow struck at Harper's Ferry...and to the abolitionists in all the countries of the world. But we owe incomparably more to Haiti than to them all. I regard her as the original pioneer emancipator of the 19th century."²⁰

Douglass had first been mentioned as candidate for Minister to Haiti in 1869, after Grant's first election. But he threw his support to Ebenezer Bassett, who reported after taking up office in Port-au-Prince: "Frederick Douglass is well known here."²¹ Therefore, we can probably take it a face value when, after President Benjamin Harrison appointed Douglass as Minister Resident and Consul General to the Republic of Haiti in 1889, Douglass told Haitian president Louis Mondestin Florvil Hyppolite that he had received no honor "at the hands of my Government" that he valued more highly.²²

Douglass' tenure in Haiti is a cautionary tale: first, about the difficulties of trying to restrain the worst impulses of empire, while serving as a representative of empire, and second, the myopia that a sense of racial allegiance can produce in the fields of politics, or human rights.

Regarding Douglass' racial affiliation with Haiti, it should be remembered that although Haiti had been independent since 1804, Congressmen from slave-holding states had blocked recognition until 1864. Considered a "Negro Republic" by supporters and detractors alike, Haiti had been isolated by European and American powers for much of its existence. So it was natural that Douglass would feel some sense of racial allegiance. Yet this clearly led Douglass and his second wife Helen Pitts, to ignore or rationalize the routine executions that Hyppolite ordered.²³

Douglass was predisposed to look for the best in America's only "Negro republic." Douglass, who did not speak French, presented Hyppolite with a French translation of *My Bondage and My Freedom*. And Hyppolite responded by calling Douglass "the incarnation of the idea which Haiti is following." Out in the streets, his wife Helen would see Hyppolite, "a man naturally humane and just," change "from a lamb to a lion" and rage through the streets of Port-au-Prince on his horse, personally leading the massacre of his political opponents. In court, Hyppolite retreated behind his gold-rimmed blue glasses, and a dignified manner.²⁴

Douglass was in Haiti because the island of Hispaniola had become a stepping stone for American expansionists. The United States had backed Hyppolite's *coup de etat*, and now, after Douglass' arrival, President Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State James Blaine began playing hardball. Blaine insisted that there had been a *quid pro quo* in which, in return for U.S. military backing, Hyppolite would allow the U.S. Navy to lease the Môle St. Nicolas as a coaling station. It was hoped that Douglass could soften up Hyppolite.

In fact, many U.S. businessmen had opposed Douglass' appointment, fearing that a "Negro" Minister "would not approve of transactions that favored American interests at the expense of Haitian interests." In a way, that proved to be true. The Douglasses returned to the U.S. on leave in June 1890. Their return was delayed almost half a year, as Blaine and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy

tried to convince President Harrison that Douglass would hurt their chances to establish a naval base at the Môle St. Nicolas. Harrison refused to fire Douglass, but assigned as his negotiating partner Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, who McFeely describes as “a man of fierce, even sadistic, temper and monumental arrogance.”²⁵

Appalled by the parading of Gherardi’s fleet in Haitian waters during negotiations, and by the Rear Admiral’s heavy-handed, condescending manner towards Haitian Secretary of State Antenor Firmin, Douglass announced bluntly that he could “not accept this as a foundation upon which I could base my diplomacy.”²⁶

With Haitian sensitivity about sovereignty, in the context of a long history of European and North American non-recognition and interference, rejection of a U.S. naval base at the Môle St. Nicolas was an almost foregone conclusion. Businessmen in New York and expansionists in Washington were quick to blame Douglass, equating his blackness and friendly relations with Haitians as being equivalent to treason. In truth, Douglass’ “lack of enthusiasm for a predatory move on the Môle St. Nicolas” was exceeded only by that of President Harrison, as McFeely writes. But the press viciously attacked Douglass, not Harrison.²⁷

His competence and patriotism had been called into question, and Douglass responded in two ways. First, Douglass felt compelled to point out that he had been advocating the acquisition of the Môle St. Nicolas for 20 years. “Since the abolition of slavery I have always contended that the United States should secure a freehold in the islands of the Caribbean Sea,” Douglass told a *Washington Post* reporter.²⁸ His response will not please contemporary anti-imperialists, but his reasoning reveals a degree of sophistication about the *realpolitik* of his era. If Great Britain, France, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain already had footholds in the region, then why should the U.S. not also maintain a presence? Douglass seemed to believe that the United States, even with its limited political participation by African Americans, would better represent the interests of African peoples in *nuestra América* than the European powers.

But Douglass also seemed intent on challenging conventional wisdom on who a Minister should serve. If Haitians viewed him as defending their independence, rather than participating imperial landgrabs, then he would “gain for the United States the trust and allegiance of the Haitian people,” writes McFeely.²⁹ Such a perspective differentiated between short-term and long-term interests, recognizing that the long-term well-being of the United States required developing the trust of its neighbors in *nuestra América*. The Haitian people did seem to remember Douglass as someone whose sense of national interest included their own well being.

Douglass had a “bully pulpit” and a degree of moral legitimacy far beyond the reach of most diplomats. His analysis of his tenure in Haiti for the *North American Review* included some biting criticisms of American arrogance and racial myopia. “White men professed to speak in the interest of black Haiti; and I could have applauded their alacrity in upholding her dignity if I could have respected their sincerity,” Douglass declared. “They thought it monstrous to compel black Haiti to receive a minister as black as herself...Prejudice sets all logic at defiance.”³⁰

Martin’s view that Douglass could not see beyond Anglo-American culture, although he rejected its racism, seems only partly true. There are dimensions in which Douglass’ critique of Anglo-American racialism called into question the very foundations of the dominant culture. In a speech addressed as much to African American as to Euro-American racialists, Douglass asked: “What is the thing we are fighting against, and what are we fighting for in this country? What is it, but American race pride; an assumption of superiority upon the ground of race and color?”³¹ Douglass felt kinship with people of African descent, but he also insisted that the Irish and Native American components of his background inspired in him a sense of community that transcended “race” or national borders. In that sense, Douglass was much closer to the *mestizo* version of national identity that was emerging in many Latin American nations, than to the black vs. white worldview in which North America was still so deeply and tragically invested.

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- 2) R.J.M. Blackett, *Building an Antislavery Wall: Black Americans in the Atlantic Abolitionist Movement, 1830-1860* (Cornell UP, 1989).
- 3) Frederick Douglass, "Farewell to the British People," in John W. Blassingame, ed., *The Frederick Douglass Papers, Volume 2: 1847-54* (Yale UP, 1982), 30-31. See Isaiah 61:1.
- 4) William S. McFeely, *Frederick Douglass* (Norton, 1991), 133-34; 156. Frederick Douglass, "Monarchies and Freedom, Republics and Slavery: An Address Delivered in Bristol, England, on 1 April 1847," in Blassingame, *Frederick Douglass Papers, Volume 2*, 56.
- 5) "The Present and Future of the Colored Race in America," (speech in New York, May 1863), in Philip S. Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume III: The Civil War 1861-1865* (International Publishers, 1952), 355-56. See also "The Mission of the War," speech at Cooper Institute, Feb. 13, 1864, in Foner, *Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Vol. III*. "Ask [the Democratic Party] why it was for the Mexican War, and it answers, Slavery. Ask why it was for the annexation of Texas, and it answers, Slavery." (392) Douglass continued to apply this lesson to current events to the end of his life. In a letter to Caesar Celso Moreno about "the Hawaiian question" (March 1894), he wrote: "We are the Jews of modern times, and when we want the lands of other people, such people are guilty of every species of abomination and are not fit to live. In our conduct to-day we are but repeating our treatment towards Mexico in the case of Texas." Philip Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume IV: Reconstruction and After* (International Publishers, 1955), 490.
- 6) Frederick Douglass, "Our Southern Sister Republic," *New National Era* (August 10, 1871), in Philip S. Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume IV: Reconstruction and After* (International Publishers, 1955), 259-61.
- 7) Waldo E. Martin, Jr., *The Mind of Frederick Douglass* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 217, 213.
- 8) Foner, *Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Vol. IV* (International, 1955), 222-23; 303.
- 9) Frederick Douglass, "Aggressions of the Slave Power: Delivered in Rochester, 22 May 1856," in John W. Blassingame, ed., *The Frederick Douglass Papers, Volume 3: 1855-63* (Yale UP, 1986), 117-18.
- 10) Ibid, 129, 119.
- 11) Foner, *Life and Writings, Volume IV*, pp. 63, 73; *New National Era* 4-6-1871; 5-30-1871.
- 12) After Reconstruction, Douglass would come to call himself an "uneasy Republican." Speech before National Negro Convention in 1883, quoted in Martin, *Mind of Frederick Douglass*, 84.
- 13) McFeely, 277. See Maria Diedrich, *Love Across Color Lines: Otilie Assing and Frederick Douglass* (Hill & Wang, 1999).
- 14) Foner, *Life and Writings, Volume IV*, 262-3.

15) Ibid, 69-70.

16) Philip S. Foner, *Frederick Douglass* (Citadel, 1964), 292. Also in *Life and Writings, IV*, 70.

17) Frederick Douglass, "One Country, One Law, One Liberty for All Citizens," 1889 interview in John W. Blassingame and John R. McKivigan, eds., *The Frederick Douglass Papers, Volume 5: 1881-95* (Yale UP, 1992), 400.

18) Foner, *Frederick Douglass*, 293; *Life & Writings, IV*, 71. McFeely, *Frederick Douglass*, 167. "buoyant," "The Nation's Problem Problem: An Address Delivered in Washington, D.C. on 16 April 1889," in Blassingame and McKivigan, *Frederick Douglass Papers, Vol. 5*, 406.

19) "A Trip to Haiti," *Douglass' Monthly* (May 1861), in Philip Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume III: The Civil War 1861-1865* (International Publishers, 1952), 85-88. Philip Foner, *The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Volume II: Pre-Civil War Decade 1850-1860* (International Publishers, 1950), 102; McFeely, 247. James Redpath, once an associate of John Brown, and general agent of the Haitian Bureau of Emigration, claimed that he had been responsible for converting Douglass from "an energetic opponent of emigration...into a friend of Hayti." Benjamin Quarles, *Frederick Douglass* (New York: Dover, 1948/1970), 556.

20) Benjamin Quarles, *Frederick Douglass*, 316; "Lecture on Haiti," in Philip Foner, *Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass, Vol. IV*, 478.

21) Quarles, 324.

22) "The Highest Honor Conferred on Me: An Address Delivered in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 14 November 1889," in Blassingame and McKivigan, *Frederick Douglass Papers, Vol. 5*, 426-29.

23) Quarles, 331; McFeely, 354.

24) McFeely, 352-54.

25) Quarles, 321. McFeely, 347-48.

26) Frederick Douglass, "Haiti and the United States: Inside History of the Negotiations for the Môle St. Nicolas," Part I, *North American Review* 153 (Sept. 1891), 344-45.

27) McFeely, 355.

28) "Resignation but not Retirement: An Interview Given in Washington, D.C. on 10 August 1891," in Blassingame and McKivigan, *Frederick Douglass Papers, Vol. 5*, 471.

29) McFeely, 351.

30) Frederick Douglass, "Haiti and the United States: Inside History of the Negotiations for the Môle St. Nicolas," Part I, *North American Review* 153 (Sept. 1891), 338. In McFeely, 358.

31) "The Nation's Problem Problem: An Address Delivered in Washington, D.C. on 16 April 1889," in Blassingame and McKivigan, *Frederick Douglass Papers, Vol. 5*, 412.